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INTRODUCTION
Blacks are underrepresented at every level of U.S. politics. Al-
though approximately 13% of the U.S. population is black, only 9% of
t Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. This article builds on two earlier
papers. For a detailed discussion of law school accreditation's discriminatory impact on
blacks, not focusing on political participation, see George B. Shepherd, No African-American
Lawyers Allowed: The Inefficient Racism of the ABA's Accreditation of Law Schools, 53 J.L.
EDUC. (forthcoming 2003). For a thorough analysis of accreditation's economic impacts, see
George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and
Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091 (1998).
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the U.S. House of Representatives is black.' There are currently no
black U.S. senators and no black governors. The process for becoming a
judge is often political, whether consisting of a politically charged ap-
pointment process or an initial or retention election. Again, the fraction
of black judges is low. Only 4% of state-court judges are black,2 and
blacks are only 7% of judges at all levels. 3 Even in states with large
black populations, the fraction of black judges is small. For example,
Georgia's population is 29% black.4 Yet only 6% of Georgia's state-
court judges are black.5 Some of blacks' difficulties in politics may be
due to residual racism among voters. Likewise, another partial explana-
tion may be the winner-take-all nature of many elections. 6
This paper suggests an additional cause: the bar exam and ABA
accreditation of law schools. Although I focus on accreditation, I will
discuss how both the bar and accreditation disproportionately exclude
blacks from entering the legal profession. However, being a lawyer is
often the easiest and best way to enter politics. 7 Indeed, many political
jobs are open only to lawyers: examples are prosecutors, attorneys gen-
eral, and judges. Thus, the bar exam and accreditation have the effect of
excluding a disproportionate fraction of blacks from politics.
Although accreditation's limiting of blacks' political opportunities
is dramatic, the harms are similar for other disadvantaged groups whom
the bar exam and accreditation exclude. These include Hispanics, as
well as those whites who lack either wealth or top test scores or grades.8
Thus, accreditation maintains in politics a wealthy, white, intellectual
elite.
I proceed as follows: Part I describes how the bar exam and law
school accreditation disproportionately exclude blacks from the legal
I U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 16
tbl.14 (2000 data) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. In the 107th Congress, thirty-nine of
the 435 representatives were black.
2 Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representa-
tion on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 95, 101 n.26 (1997) (1985 data). But see
ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, AM. BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE
PROFESSION, MILES TO Go 2000: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 16
[hereinafter MILES TO Go] (noting lack of recent data on race of state-court judges).
3 MILES TO Go, supra note 2, at 16 (reporting data from 1990 census). Blacks did best
at the federal level. As of 1999 in the federal system, blacks made up I 1% of district court
judges and 7% of court of appeals judges, plus one black justice on the Supreme Court. Id. at
18 tbl.42.
4 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note I, at 27 tbl.24.
5 Walter C. Jones, Black Judges Remain Rare, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.), May 20, 2002,
at B I (providing 2002 figures).
6 See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness
in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 222 (1989) (arguing that
winner-take-all elections are exclusionary).
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 See infra notes 142 & 143 and accompanying text.
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profession. Next, Part II suggests that this exclusion from the legal pro-
fession also excludes blacks from politics. In Part III, I suggest that both
blacks and the country as a whole would benefit from eliminating the bar
exam and accreditation as barriers to the legal profession.
I. ACCREDITATION AND THE EXCLUSION OF
BLACK LAWYERS
The American Bar Association (ABA) acknowledges the national
scandal of the low number of blacks in the legal profession:9 blacks are
only 5.7% of lawyers, yet they make up 13% of the population.10 Blacks
are less represented in the law than in most other professions, including
physicians." The ABA professes to be dedicated to increasing the num-
ber of minority lawyers. For example, it claims that one of its main
missions is "to increase racial and ethnic diversity at all levels of the
legal profession."' 2 The ABA has proceeded on many fronts, creating
commissions, diversity initiatives, action groups, councils, "diversity
days," and scholarships. 13
However, the ABA's diversity efforts ring hollow, for it is the ABA
itself that has caused blacks to be excluded from the profession. The
ABA, collaborating with state governments and courts, has created and
maintains two barriers that prevent blacks from entering the legal profes-
sion in larger, fairer numbers. The first is the bar exam. A long litera-
ture describes both how the bar exam excludes blacks at a much higher
rate than it excludes whites and how the bar exam fails to test real lawy-
ering ability. 14
9 See, e.g., MILES TO Go, supra note 2, at ix-x ("Minorities continue to be under-
represented in the legal profession relative to their representation in other professions ...
Thus, the legal profession-already one of the least integrated professions in the country-
threatens to become even less representative of the citizens and society it serves.").
10 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 380 tbl.593, 16 tbl.14. The percentage of
black lawyers is an increase from 3.4% in 1990. MILES TO Go, supra note 2, at 1, 2 tbl.2
(2000).
1 1 MILES TO Go, supra note 2, at 2 tbl.2.
12 William G. Paul, Foreword to AM. BAR ASS'N, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RE-
SOURCES GUIDE: PROGRAMS TO ADVANCE RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 3 (July 2000); see also ABA Goal IX ("To promote full and equal participation in the
legal profession by minorities, women and persons with disabilities."), id. at 13.
13 See Shepherd, supra note t, at n.8.
14 See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt et al., Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of
Recent Increases to Passing Scores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 965-68 (2001)
(citing empirical studies of disproportionate impact on minorities); Daniel R. Hansen, Note,
Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justifications for the Bar
Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191, 1191 n.3 (1995)
(collecting literature on criticism of bar exams); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Symposium, Represent-
ing Race: The Underrepresentation of Minorities in the Legal Profession: A Critical Race
Theorist's Perspective, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1005, 1033 (1997) (arguing that the market, rather
than state regulation, should govern legal education and the sale of legal services).
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This paper focuses on the second high barrier to blacks' full entry
into the legal profession: the ABA's elaborate system for accreditation of
law schools. Almost all states grant licenses to practice law only to stu-
dents who have graduated from ABA-accredited law schools; unless a
school satisfies the ABA's accreditation standards, its graduates cannot
practice law.15 The ABA has chosen accreditation standards that operate
generally to grant accreditation to law schools that serve white students
but that deny accreditation to law schools that would serve black stu-
dents. After providing a brief history of accreditation's racist roots, I
discuss accreditation's two discriminatory impacts: academic discrimina-
tion and financial discrimination.
A. ABA ACCREDITATION'S RACIST HISTORY
Until the 1920s, entry into the legal profession was relatively open.
In 1923, no state required an applicant to the bar to have attended any
law school at all.' 6 Instead, in all states, a person could become a li-
censed lawyer by clerking for a specified period in a law firm and then
passing the bar exam. Bar exams were "casual, local, and undemand-
ing." 7 If one chose to learn the law by going to law school, admissions
at law schools were not selective. Until 1927, anyone who could pay the
tuition could study at any law school, including Harvard and Yale.' 8
Moreover, one could attend law school with little academic preparation.
Indeed, forty-three states required no formal education whatsoever be-
yond high school; thirty-two states did not even require a high school
diploma. 19
During this period when the profession was wide open to whites,
overt discrimination caused the profession to include almost no blacks.
In 1910, the United States had only 795 black lawyers. 20 This was only
0.7% of the profession, although blacks were 11.1% of the population. 21
In 1914, the ABA accidentally admitted its first three blacks. Recogniz-
ing its mistake, the ABA rescinded their admission, stating that "the set-
15 See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note t, at 2114-27.
16 RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 42 (1989); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:
LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 99 (1983).
17 ABEL, supra note 16, at 62-63.
18 Id. at 59. However, elite schools weeded out many students through attrition; in
1926-27, Harvard failed about 250 of the 700 first-year students. STEVENS, supra note 16, at
160.
19 ABEL, supra note 16, at 48-49.
20 Id. at 99-100.
21 Id.
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tled practice of the Association has been to elect only white men to
membership. 22 The ABA formally excluded blacks until 1943.23
During the late 1920s and 1930s, the organized bar began to be
economically harmed by competition from an influx of new lawyers,
many of whom were minorities. 24 The main new route to the legal pro-
fession was the large number of for-profit, part-time night law schools
that began opening around 1900.25 These schools, with cheap tuition,
undemanding admissions requirements, and lower academic standards,
had been founded primarily to serve ethnic minorities. 26 In the early
1900s, the country's largest law school was Boston's Suffolk Law
School, a for-profit night school with 4000 students.27 Ethnic minorities
exploited the new opportunity; for several years during this period, more
than 80% of bar admissions in New York were Jewish. 28 Despite op-
pressive racial discrimination in law schools and the legal profession, the
number of black lawyers doubled between 1900 and 1940, both in abso-
lute numbers and as a proportion of the profession-although the number
of black attorneys was still small.29
Expressing both bigotry and economic self-interest in eliminating
competition from new lawyers, the bar acted to stop the influx of new
minority lawyers in two new ways: decreasing bar exam pass rates and
tightening law-school accreditation. Although the ABA sometimes as-
serted that the tough bar exams and accreditation were necessary for con-
sumer protection, 30 it was no coincidence that the calls for consumer
protection came only when many new minority lawyers were beginning
to compete effectively with the ABA's members.
The first new approach that the bar employed was to lower the pass
rate on state bar exams. 31 The reason that many state bar officials stated
for decreasing the pass rate was to eliminate "overcrowding" in the pro-
fession-that is, to reduce competition for existing lawyers. 32
The second means that the bar used to reduce competition from new
minority lawyers was to close law schools that served minorities and to
22 GERALDINE R. SEGAL, BLACKS IN THE LAW: PHILADELPHIA AND THE NATION 17
(1983).
23 Id. at 19.
24 See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note t, at 2116-18.
25 Id. at 2115.
26 Id. at 2115; see also STEVENS, supra note 16, at 74; ABEL, supra note 16, at 57.
27 ABEL, supra note 16, at 54.
28 Id. at 85-86 (from 1930 to 1934).
29 Id. at 100 (in 1900, there were 730 black lawyers, 0.5% all lawyers; in 1940, there
were 1952, 1.1% of the profession).
30 For example, ABA representatives often argued that higher standards were necessary
to eliminate lawyers who behaved unethically. See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 100, 102.
31 See ABEL, supra note 16, at 64, 75.
32 Id. at 65.
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do this by imposing accreditation requirements that disfavored those
schools. The ABA imposed requirements that prohibited for-profit
schools, that required law school students to have obtained expensive
undergraduate education, and that eventually required expensive build-
ings and libraries and expensive full-time faculty rather than less expen-
sive adjunct professors. 33 More directly, the ABA eventually began to
refuse to accredit law schools whose students lacked either high scores
on standardized tests or high undergraduate grades. 34
The words of bar officials and law school representatives make
clear that a main reason that the bar sought to impose the new require-
ments was to rid the legal profession of minorities who were now com-
peting with nonminority lawyers. Among many other examples, 35 the
dean of the University of Chicago Law School, John Henry Wigmore,
wrote that a requirement of two years of college would be "a rational,
beneficent measure of reducing hereafter the spawning mass of promis-
cuous semi-intelligence which now enters the bar."'36 Likewise, an ABA
official indicated in the ABA Report that many of the lawyers who came
before the local bar grievance committees were "Russian Jew Boys." 37
During the Depression, the ABA was able to convince state and
federal governments to grant licenses to practice law only to graduates of
law schools that received ABA accreditation. In 1923, no state required
graduation from law school, much less from an ABA-accredited
school. 38 In 1935, only nine states required a degree from an ABA-ac-
credited school; by 1938, twenty-three states did. 39 Today, almost all
states require graduation from an accredited law school.40 The bar also
succeeded in convincing states to require substantial education before
law school. In 1927, only six states required any college; only Kansas
33 See ABEL, supra note 16, at 48-58; Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note t, at 2129-52.
34 Although the requirements of high average LSAT scores and undergraduate grades do
not appear in the written accreditation standards, accreditors in practice impose the require-
ments as an interpretation of Standard 501's prohibition against admitting students who cannot
be expected to pass the bar exam. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS (2000) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], standard 501; see
Shepherd, supra note t.
35 Shepherd, supra note t.
36 ABEL, supra note 16, at 47.
37 STEVENS, supra note 16, at 176.
38 ABEL, supra note 16, at 42; STEVENS, supra note 16, at 99.
39 ABEL, supra note 16, at 55.
40 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC.
& ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS
16-17 (2002) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE], available at http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/publications/compguide/compguide.html.
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required more than one year of it. 4 1 By 1942, almost all states required
at least two years of college.42
The ABA's campaign of racist self-interest succeeded. As it shut
law schools that served blacks, 43 the accreditation campaign had the de-
sired impact of reducing the number of black lawyers. Between 1940,
when most existing lawyers had received their educations before accredi-
tation was imposed, and 1960, after accreditation's full impacts were felt,
the fraction of U.S. lawyers who were black fell from 1.1% to 0.8%.44
Between 1940 and 1950, the number of black lawyers fell even in abso-
lute numbers, from 1952 to 1450.45 Only in 1970, after affirmative ac-
tion began, did the fraction of black lawyers again achieve its level of
1940.46
B. THE ABA's ACADEMIC DISCRIMINATION
ABA accreditors grant accreditation only to law schools that admit
high-quality students.47 In practice, this means schools that serve whites
but not blacks. Of the ABA's accreditation requirements that discrimi-
nate academically, the three most harmful are high LSAT scores, high
undergraduate grade point averages, and high bar-pass rates.
1. Requiring High LSAT Scores
None of the ABA-accredited law schools has students with an aver-
age LSAT score below approximately 142.48 This is because the ABA
denies accreditation to any law school with average LSAT scores below
this level; indeed, as many examples of accreditors' communications
with law schools show, the usual requirement is an average LSAT score
of approximately 143. 49
41 ABEL, supra note 16, at 49.
42 Id.
43 The accreditation campaign quickly caused the closing of three black law schools:
Freylinghuysen in Washington, D.C., in 1927, Virginia Union in 1928, and Simmons in Ken-
tucky in 1932. ABEL, supra note 16, at 101.
44 Id. at 100.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See Letter from James P. White, ABA Consultant on Legal Education, to Stanley M.
Talcott, Dean of Barry University of Orlando School of Law, and Jeanne O'Laughlin, Presi-
dent of Barry University 3 (May 16, 2000) (on file with author) (indicating that accreditation
would be granted only if law school attracted "higher quality students").
48 See U.S. News & World Report, America's Best Graduate Schools (2000) [hereinafter
U.S. News Graduate Rankings]. See also AM. BAR Ass'N, OFFICIAL ABA GUIDE TO AP-
PROVED LAW SCHOOLS (2001) [hereinafter OFFICIAL ABA GUIDE]. Law schools usually report
the LSAT scores of their students at the 25th and 75th percentiles. My admittedly inexact
estimate of the school's average LSAT score is the mean of the school's scores for the 25th
and 75th percentiles.
49 See Shepherd, supra note t.
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This standard discriminates against blacks. Perhaps because of
fewer educational opportunities or culturally biased testing, blacks score
much lower on the LSAT than whites do. In 1999-2000, the average
LSAT score for white test-takers was 152.50 In contrast, the average
score for blacks was 141.6, more than ten points lower. 51 Applying the
143 cutoff, the ABA would accredit a school that served a completely
average group of white students. Indeed, a school with students who
scored in the bottom 16% for whites would still satisfy the accreditation
standards. 52
In contrast, the LSAT requirement prohibits the ABA from granting
accreditation to a law school that serves the average black. Even a
school with students with average LSAT scores in the fifty-fourth per-
centile for blacks would fail the accreditation requirements. 53
2. Requiring High Undergraduate Grades
The ABA will not accredit a law school unless the school's students
earned high undergraduate grades. None of the ABA-accredited law
schools has students with an average undergraduate grade point average
(UGPA) below approximately 2.7, or B-minus. 54 The ABA interprets its
standards that demand that a law school's students be expected to pass
the bar exam to require denial of accreditation to law schools with stu-
dents with average UGPAs below this level. As with the LSAT cutoff,
this is seen in the ABA's action letters. 55
Again, the standard discriminates against blacks. Perhaps because
of fewer early educational resources, blacks receive much lower under-
graduate grades than whites. The average black applicant to law school
received a B-minus UGPA; the average for whites was a B-plus. 56 As
with the LSAT requirement, the ABA's B-minus UGPA cutoff would
grant accreditation to a law school that would serve whites with below-
average grades among whites, even far below average. In contrast, it
would deny accreditation to a similar school for blacks.
50 See LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAT PERFORMANCE WITH REGIONAL, GENDER,
AND ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS: 1993-1994 THROUGH 1999-2000 TESTING YEARS (2000), and
data obtained directly from the Law School Admission Council (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter LSAT PERFORMANCE].
51 Id.
52 The standard deviation of LSAT scores for white test-takers in 1998-1999 was 8.96.
Id. Thus, white students with scores of 143 would be in the 16th percentile for whites.
53 This follows because the standard deviation for blacks in 1998-1999 was 8.52. Id.
54 See U.S. News Graduate Rankings, supra note 48; see also OFFICIAL ABA GUIDE,
supra note 48. As for LSAT data, schools usually report statistics on undergraduate grades at
the 25th and 75th percentiles To estimate average undergraduate grades, I calculated the mean
of the 25th and 75th percentile figures.
55 See Shepherd, supra note t.
56 See LSAT PERFORMANCE, supra note 50.
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3. Requiring High First-Time Bar-Pass Rates
A few states, such as California, Massachusetts, and Maine, permit
students from schools without ABA accreditation to take the state's bar
exam. 57 However, students from these unaccredited schools usually may
not sit for the bar in other states; California is a central example. 58 Such
an unaccredited school may seek ABA accreditation after many years of
operation and after many of the school's students have taken the state's
bar exam. For such law schools with an existing track record, the ABA
denies accreditation if the school's students pass the bar at a low rate,
either in absolute terms or in comparison with the accredited schools in
the state. 59
Again, this discriminates against schools that serve blacks. Blacks
pass the bar at lower rates than whites, at least on their first attempt. For
example, in the July 2002 California bar exam, the pass rates for first-
time takers were 70% for whites and 39% for blacks. 60 The difference
has been stark for many years. In California between 1977 and 1988,
73% of white first-time test takers passed, on average, compared with
30% for blacks.6 ' In New York for the period from 1985 to 1988, the
average pass rate for first-time takers was 73% for whites and 31% for
blacks. 62
4. Excluding Blacks
By closing law schools that would have served students with moder-
ate academic credentials, the ABA's cutoffs have succeeded in ensuring
that only a trickle of blacks will be able to enter the profession. A recent
study suggests that but for affirmative action, only 1821 blacks would
have had the qualifications in 1998-99 to be admitted to even the least-
exclusive U.S. law school.63 The ABA's academic standards create a
57 COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 40, at 10-11; OFFICIAL ABA GUIDE, supra note
48, at 36-37.
58 See supra sources at note 48.
59 See Shepherd, supra note t.
60 See CAL. BD. OF BAR EXAMINERS, GENERAL STATISTICS REPORT: JULY 2002 CALIFOR-
NIA BAR EXAMINATION (2003), at 2, available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/admis-
sions/JULY2002STATS.pdf.
61 Stephen P. Klein, Disparities in Bar Exam Passing Rates Among Racial/Ethnic
Groups: Their Size, Source, and Implications, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 517, 519 (1991);
Stephan Thernstrom, Diversity and Meritocracy in Legal Education: A Critical Evaluation of
Linda F. Wightman's The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 31
(1998). For additional statistics, see ABEL, supra note 16, at 103-04.
62 Edna Wells Handy, Blacks, the Bell Curve, and the Bar Exam, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 15,
1996, at 1 (evaluating July exams only).
63 I obtain the estimate of 1821 black admittees for 1998-99 by extrapolating from esti-
mates for 1990-91. See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Ad-
missions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 tbl.5 (1997). According to Wightman, in
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system that, without affirmative action, would have allowed only 22% of
the 8375 blacks who applied to law school to be accepted at even the
least-selective law school. 64 The remaining 6554 blacks would not have
been qualified to gain admission to any school. In contrast, the ABA
standards permitted 75% of white applicants to gain admission: 35,967
of 47,787.65 That is, the accreditation system excludes almost 80% of
black applicants, compared with only 25% of whites.
The larger proportion of black students in undergraduate education
gives some indication of ABA accreditation's impacts. In undergraduate
education, where colleges may enter the market without meeting strict
accreditation requirements, blacks make up 11% of enrollment, com-
pared with 7% in law schools. 66
5. Shutting Black Law Schools
In undergraduate education, the best route to success for blacks is
often not the elite colleges and universities but a group of more than a
hundred "historically black colleges" with primarily black students.67
Examples are Howard University, Morehouse College, and Spelman Col-
lege. The HBCs, not the elite colleges, have provided the training for
many of today's black leaders. Although only 16% of black college stu-
dents attend HBCs, of the thirty-three blacks that President Bill Clinton
appointed to the federal judiciary, 40% attended HBCs. 68 In a list of the
undergraduate institutions that produced the most black graduates who
went on to earn Ph.D.s, nine of the top ten schools were HBCs. 69
Although HBCs educate a large fraction of the blacks who achieve
great success, HBCs are not selective by national standards. For exam-
ple, Spelman, which a Black Enterprise survey ranked as providing the
best education for blacks,70 admitted 54% of its applicants in 1997-98,
and the average combined SAT score for the school's students was only
1990-91, only 1631 blacks would have had the LSAT scores and UGPAs to be admitted to
even the least-exclusive U.S. law school. This compares with the 3435 total black students
who were actually admitted, including because of affirmative action. Id. Multiplying this
ratio of 1631 to 3435 by the 3835 total black admittees in 1998-99 yields an estimate of 1821
for the number of blacks who would have had the credentials to gain admission in 1998-99.
See also LSAT PERFORMANCE, supra note 50.
64 See supra note 63.
65 See supra note 63 for sources and methods.
66 Chronicle of Higher Education, 2000-2001 Almanac Issue, August 2000, at 24; MILES
TO Go, supra note 2, at 3 tbl.4.
67 See Thomas LaVeist & Marjorie Whigham-Desir, Top 50 Colleges for African Ameri-
cans, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Jan. 1999, at 71.
68 The Higher Education of President Clinton's Black Judges, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER
EDUC., Autumn 1996, at 29.
69 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUMMARY REPORT 1996: DOCTORATE RECIPIENTS
FROM UNITED STATES UNIVERSITIES 42 tbl.9 (1998)
70 LaVeist & Whigham-Desir, supra note 67, at 71.
DEFENDING THE ARISTOCRACY
approximately 1055-compared with approximately 1500 for Harvard.
These figures placed it in the fourth of five tiers in the overall ranking in
U.S. News and World Report.71
The ABA's academic accreditation gtandardg kill off almost all of
the black law schools that would otherwise resemble the HBCs; because
their black students would have modest test scores and grades, the black
law schools cannot obtain accreditation. For example, the ABA has per-
severed in a long campaign to close Georgia's only law school that
serves a large proportion of black students, John Marshall Law School in
Atlanta.72 Forty-one percent of John Marshall's students are black, one
of the highest proportions for law schools in the country. 73 Similarly, the
ABA is now threatening to deny reaccreditation to Thurgood Marshall
Law School at Texas Southern University, the only law school in Texas
that serves large numbers of blacks.74
The ABA's academic cutoffs are equivalent to a rule that limits the
total number of black law schools to five. Of the ABA-accredited
schools, only Howard University in the District of Columbia, North Car-
olina Central University, Southern University in Louisiana, Texas South-
ern University, and the University of the District of Columbia enroll
more than 40% blacks. 75
The more than 4500 black law school applicants who each year do
not receive admission to any school gives some idea of the large number
of new black law schools that could arise if accreditation loosened.
Eliminating the LSAT cutoff would allow the creation of more than
eighty new 600-student, majority-black law schools, an average of more
than one or two per state.76
6. Affirmative Action is No Cure
Affirmative action returns to blacks only a small fraction of the law
school positions that accreditation takes away. We have seen that but for
affirmative action, accreditation's academic requirements would have ex-
cluded from admission approximately 6554 of 8375 applicants; only
1821 would have been admitted purely on their LSAT scores and grades.
Because law schools actually admitted a total of 3835 blacks, we see that
71 See U.S. News & World Report, America's Best Colleges (2000).
72 Julia D. Gray, Dean Touts New John Marshall with Upgrades, Advertising Push,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Atlanta), May 30, 2002, at 1; Janet L. Conley, Court Turns
Hourglass Again for Marshall, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Atlanta), June 13, 2001, at 1.
73 See Shepherd, supra note t.
74 See Ron Nissimov, ABA Wants TSU Law School to Hike Entrance Standards, HOUST.
CHRON., July 25, 2001, at Al.
75 See OFFICIAL ABA GUIDE, supra note 48.
76 The 4540 black law-school applicants who were rejected from all law schools in
1998-1999 would fill ninety law schools with classes of 200 that included 50% blacks.
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2014 were admitted due to affirmative action.77 Although affirmative
action doubles the number of black law students, the 2014 blacks whom
affirmative action admits constitute less than one-third of the more than
6500 black law school applicants whom the ABA's accreditation pro-
gram caused to be rejected. Even with affirmative action, the ABA sys-
tem excludes a much higher proportion of blacks than whites-54% of
black applicants are rejected by all law schools where they apply, com-
pared with only 25% of white applicants.7"
The need for eliminating accreditation is becoming more urgent be-
cause of current attacks on affirmative action. Court challenges, such as
the Hopwood case in the Fifth Circuit,79 and ballot initiatives, such as
those in California and Washington,80 have already eliminated affirma-
tive action to varying degrees. The Supreme Court's upcoming ruling on
the University of Michigan's affirmative action program8' might restrict
affirmative action further. Without affirmative action, blacks would suf-
fer the full impact of the ABA's academic and financial discrimination.
C. THE ABA's FINANCIAL DISCRIMINATION
The ABA's accreditation requirements discriminate financially be-
cause they make entry into the legal profession more expensive, dispro-
portionately excluding blacks.
1. Increasing the Price of Admission
The ABA requirements increase the cost of becoming a lawyer by
increasing law school tuition. The requirements impose many costs on
law schools. For example, accreditation standards effectively fix and
raise faculty salaries, limit faculty teaching loads, require high numbers
of full-time faculty rather than less expensive part-time adjuncts, and re-
quire expensive physical facilities and library collections.8 2 The require-
ments likely cause law schools' costs to more than double, increasing
77 See LSAT PERFORMANCE, supra note 50. Again, these calculations estimate 1998
statistics by extrapolating from 1991-1992 data. See supra note 63.
78 In 1998-99, 3835 of 8375 black applicants were admitted to at least one law school,
compared with 35,967 of 47,787 white applicants. See LSAT PERFORMANCE, supra note 50.
79 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (strik-
ing down affirmative action program); see also MILES TO Go, supra note 2, at 22-23 (describ-
ing trend of eliminating affirmative action).
80 Cal. Prop. 209 (1995) (prohibiting use of race as an admission criterion in public
education); Wash. Initiative 200 (1998) (prohibiting consideration of race as a criterion in,
among other things, university admissions).
81 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.) (upholding law school's affirmative ac-
tion program), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002). (*Eds. On June 23, 2003, the Supreme
Court upheld the consideration of race as a factor for law school admission. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325.)
82 For a detailed discussion of accreditation's impacts on the costs of legal education, see
Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note t, at 2176-89.
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them by more than $10,000 per year per student, with many schools then
passing the increased costs along to students by raising tuition; to avoid
bankruptcy, a private school with no endowment income must pass all
costs along to students.83
The impact of the increased costs from accreditation can be seen by
comparing tuition rates at accredited schools and unaccredited schools.
Accredited private schools normally charge more than $20,000 per
year. 84 Unaccredited schools usually charge approximately half that
amount. For example, the average tuition for ABA-accredited law
schools in the Los Angeles area is $21,135, compared with only $9339
for the area's two unaccredited schools.85 The one exception to this pat-
tern is public accredited schools, which often charge less than private
accredited schools, especially for in-state students; taxpayers rather than
students pay some of the costs that accreditation imposes.
One example of the accreditation requirements that force tuition up-
ward is the requirement that an accredited school have a large library and
extensive library collection. The ABA sets forth detailed requirements
for libraries' collections and physical resources.8 6 The ABA requires a
minimum expenditure on the library of approximately $1 million per
year.87 Of the 179 schools that the ABA has been willing to accredit, all
but seven have library budgets above this amount. 88
The required library spending substantially increases the school's
expenses and the tuition that it must charge. For example, if a law school
has 200 students, the $1 million yearly library expense is $5,000 per
student.
In addition, the ABA requirements increase students' cost of enter-
ing the legal profession in other ways. For example, the requirements
force students to attend at least six years of expensive higher education:
three years of college 89 and three years of law school.90 Before 1927,
people in some states could enter the legal profession as an apprentice
83 See id. at 2177. Although information on law schools' endowment size is scarce, the
impact of lower-ranked schools' absence of endowment income can be seen in the small aver-
age financial aid awards that the schools can afford to offer. See Shepherd, supra note t.
84 OFFICIAL ABA GUIDE, supra note 48.
85 See IAN VAN TUYL ET AL., THE PRINCETON REVIEW, THE BEST LAW SCHOOLS (2000);
Shepherd, supra note t, at nn.187 & 188.
86 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 34, standards 601-06, 702.
87 One head law librarian and member of many accreditation teams indicated that $1
million was the minimum. Private discussion with Robin Mills, Law Librarian, Emory Uni-
versity School of Law (Nov. 2000).
88 Ass'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., LAW LIBRARY COMPREHENSIVE STATISTICAL TABLE-
DATA FROM FALL 1999 ANNUAL QUESTIONNAIRE, April 6, 2000 (on file with author).
89 ABA Standard 502(a) permits law schools to admit students who have completed
three-fourths of the work acceptable for a bachelor's degree.
90 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 34, standards 304(b) (requiring at least six semesters of
study), 502(a).
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directly after high school, without college or law school. Now, a person
can become a lawyer only if she can afford to take at least six years off
from work after high school and pay six years of tuition.
2. Excluding Blacks
Because black families have lower incomes and wealth than most
other groups, the high entry price that the ABA imposes is a filter, like
the academic accreditation requirements, that eliminates blacks from the
legal profession. The average income for a black family in 1999 was
only $31,778. 91 This was only 62% of the average income for white
families, $51,224.92
Because the ABA's system of legal training is expensive, many stu-
dents can become lawyers only with financial assistance from their fami-
lies. The system discriminates against blacks because far more white
families than black families have the resources to provide the necessary
assistance. More white families than black families can provide at least
partial subsidies to support their children during the more than six years
of training to become a lawyer when the child earns little income and
makes large tuition payments.
Student loans do not solve the problem. Because most blacks have
modest test scores, the lower-paying law jobs that most can expect after
law school are insufficient to repay the large loans necessary to attend an
accredited law school. 93
3. Eliminating Black Law Schools
Like the academic discrimination, the ABA's financial discrimina-
tion destroys law schools that would serve average blacks. Students will
attend a law school only if the jobs that they can obtain after graduation
will permit them to repay their student loans from attending the school; a
school that leads students to inevitable bankruptcy will attract few stu-
dents. 94 Elite law schools can charge high tuition levels because the
high-paying jobs that their graduates receive permit their students to re-
pay their large student loans.
In contrast, low-ranked schools must charge much less; because
graduates of these schools earn much less, the graduates can afford to
repay only smaller student loans. However, because accreditation
91 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 437 tbl.669.
92 Id.
93 See Shepherd, supra note f, at Part IV.C.
94 The existing unaccredited schools survive because they can offer less expensive tui-
tion; in states that permit them, unaccredited schools do not struggle under the expensive
accreditation requirements that drive up costs and tuition at accredited schools.
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doubles law schools' costs, 95 charging tuition low enough to attract these
students would cause the schools to go bankrupt. The only schools that
survive are those that obtain for their graduates jobs that pay enough to
permit repayment of loans that cover high tuition charges. Accreditation
causes inevitable failure for schools that can obtain for their graduates
only jobs that pay less than this.
This explains why all of the law schools that predominantly serve
blacks are public schools that charge tuition below $10,000.96 If the
schools reduced the taxpayer subsidy and increased tuition above this
level, then they would lose most of their students. Higher tuition levels
would prevent graduates' jobs from repaying the graduates' student
loans. 97 An accredited private school that attempted to serve average
blacks without a state subsidy or large endowment would inevitably fail.
II. EXCLUDING BLACKS FROM POLITICS
The ABA accreditation system's exclusion of most blacks from the
legal profession inflicts many harms. 98 For example, accreditation di-
rectly damages those whom it excludes, by barring the door to a re-
warding, lucrative career in the law; accreditation is one reason that
blacks' average incomes are much lower than whites' incomes.99 The
accreditation system also closes an important path for blacks to improve
their socioeconomic positions. Before accreditation began in the mid-
1920s, the legal profession offered an important path for many immi-
grants and minorities to raise themselves from poverty.' 00 Accreditation
blocks this path, locking in the existing white-dominated social
hierarchy.
Likewise, accreditation makes legal services unaffordable for most
blacks. It reduces substantially the potential number of lawyers of all
races, probably by at least a third.10 Through the laws of supply and
95 See supra note 83.
96 Although Howard Law School, the leading black law school, is nominally private, it
receives subsidies from the federal government each year of more than $200 million. See
Charles Dervarics, Students of Color Win in Final Education Budget, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER
EDUC., Dec. 23, 1999, at 8 (reporting subsidy of $219.4 million for Howard in 2000). Al-
though Howard's nominal tuition level is $12,785, its median award for students who receive
financial aid is $9000, so that the average student obtains $4890. OFFICIAL ABA GUIDE, supra
note 48, at 203. The net cost to the average student, including the financial aid subsidy, is thus
$7895.
97 Howard is the exception among the black schools, serving the black elite, not average
blacks: its students' LSAT scores, UGPAs, and starting law salaries are much higher than for
average blacks. See Shepherd, supra note t.
98 For a detailed description of many of the harms, see Shepherd, supra note t.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 91 & 92.
100 See supra Part I.A.
101 In 1998-99, more than 34,000, or 40%, of those who took the LSAT were not admit-
ted to law school. LSAT PERFORMANCE, supra note 50. Even if we count only those who
2003]
652 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12:637
demand, this reduction in the supply of lawyers leads inevitably to a
sharp increase in the price of legal services. ' 0 2 In addition, high wages in
a profession are necessary to compensate an entrant when great expense
must be incurred for learning his or her trade. By raising the cost of law
school and imposing other expensive academic requirements, accredita-
tion further increases the price of legal services. The increases especially
harm potential black consumers of legal services because of blacks' low
average incomes. Legal services become services mainly for corpora-
tions, the wealthy, and horribly injured people who can attract a contin-
gency lawyer.
Here, I will focus on another harm: accreditation's exclusion of
blacks from politics.
A. A GOVERNMENT OF LAWYERS
Lawyers dominate politics in the U.S. more than in any other coun-
try.' 0 3 As Tocqueville wrote of the United States in the 1830s, "the aris-
tocracy occupies the judicial bench and the bar."0 Tocqueville did not
mean to criticize lawyers or to assert that they were elitist. He noted that
because the U.S. had replaced hereditary nobility with democracy, law-
yers, with their skills and intelligence, would naturally be elected by the
populace to leadership positions:
The government of democracy is favorable to the politi-
cal power of lawyers; for when the wealthy, the noble,
and the prince are excluded from the government, the
lawyers take possession of it, in their own right, as it
were, since they are the only men of information and
sagacity, beyond the sphere of the people, who can be
the object of the popular choice. 10 5
Lawyers' position of power was beneficial: "The authority [Ameri-
cans] have entrusted to members of the legal profession, and the influ-
ence that these individuals exercise in the government, are the most
powerful existing security against the excesses of democracy."' 0 6
Tocqueville's observation remains true today. Lawyers dominate
politics, far out of proportion to their numbers. In general, the higher the
actually apply to law schools and are rejected, the number of new lawyers declines by more
than 23,000, or 31%. Id.
102 See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note t, at 2173-79.
103 ABEL, supra note 16, at 175 (citing DAVID PODMORE, SOLICITORS AND THE WIDER
COMMUNITY ch. 3 (1980)).
104 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. 16 (Phillips Bradley ed. &
Henry Reeve trans., 1945).
105 Id.
106 Id.
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political office, the higher the proportion of lawyers. This is true for
both elected and appointed political positions.
Lawyers' numbers dwarf other professions' in elective office.
Many elected offices are filled completely by lawyers. For example,
only lawyers can become state attorneys general. Almost always, only
lawyers can become state judges.
Even in elected offices for which a law degree is not a prerequisite,
lawyers prevail. Although lawyers are less than 1% of the population, 10 7
lawyers for many years made up approximately 25% of state houses and
40% of state senates. 10 8 They were 39% of the 2001-02 members of the
U.S. House of Representatives and 55% of U.S. senators. 10 9 Similarly
large numbers of governors have been lawyers. 1" 0 Two-thirds of U.S.
presidents have been lawyers."'
Lawyers similarly overshadow other professions in appointed politi-
cal positions and in appointed positions that can lead to other political
positions. Only lawyers can be appointed to law-enforcement positions
such as district attorney, U.S. attorney, U.S. attorney general, and judge.
Likewise, attorneys are overrepresented in appointed political positions
for which being a lawyer is not a prerequisite. Considering top elected
and appointed positions together, one early calculation indicated that
since 1789, of presidents, vice presidents, cabinet members, Supreme
Court justices, and speakers of the House, three-fourths had been
lawyers. 112
B. LAWYERS' ADVANTAGES IN POLITICS
Lawyers' domination of politics has several causes. Their training
and experience in advocacy and dispute resolution prepare them for po-
litical conflict.' 13 In addition, four factors reduce lawyers' risks and
107 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note I, at 380 tbl.593 (placing fraction at 0.35%)
108 Michael Cohen, Lawyers and Political Careers, 3 L. & Soc'y REV. 563, 569 tbl.l
(1969) (although old, the study is the most complete reference). Recently, the proportion of
lawyers in state legislatures has declined somewhat. According to the National Conference of
State Legislatures (NCSL), 15.8% of state legislators are lawyers, down from 22% in 1976.
NCSL statistical summary, on file with author. However, NCSL concedes that their data un-
derstate the true number of lawyer-legislators because some legislators who indicate that they
are "full-time legislators" rather than lawyers were formerly lawyers or had legal training.
Telephone conversation with Tim Storey, Statistical Director, National Conference of State
Legislatures, Mar. 24, 2003.
109 See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, at http://bi-
oguide.congress.gov. Historically, the percentages were even greater. See ABEL, supra note
16, at 175.
110 Cohen, supra note 108, at 569 tbl.l.
I I I See id. at 569.
112 Cohen, supra note 108, at 569.
1 13 See David R. Derge, The Lawyer as Decision-Maker in the American State Legisla-
ture, 21 J. POL. 408, 432 (1959).
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costs of obtaining political office, giving them a substantial advantage
over nonlawyers.
First, lawyers dominate in higher political offices because only they
qualify for many of the intermediate offices that are typical stepping
stones to the higher offices. For example, a frequent route to a state
governorship is prosecutor to state attorney general to governor." 14 Only
a lawyer qualifies for the first two positions. In turn, a governorship is a
common stepping stone to being a U.S. senator, 1 5 and lawyers have an
advantage in reaching this stepping stone.
Second, the costs to lawyers of seeking political office are often
lower than for those in other professions. Temporary political employ-
ment often promotes a lawyer's normal law practice; political office
brings the lawyer visibility that leads to new clients.' 16 In contrast, seek-
ing political office can often derail other careers.
Third, further reducing lawyers' costs of seeking political office is
the large number of backstop politically appointed jobs that are available
only to lawyers. When deciding whether to seek elective political office,
the lawyer recognizes that even if his political service harms his legal
practice, he is still eligible to be appointed a judge or U.S. attorney as a
safety net.' 1 7 Alternatively, the lawyer can intentionally use elected po-
litical office as a route to a lawyers-only appointed position." 8
Fourth, lawyers enjoy advantages for success within many elective
bodies, aiding them in obtaining even higher offices. For example,
within most legislative bodies, only lawyers are permitted to serve on the
prestigious judiciary committee, and they are given preference in other
committees, such as the rules committee.' 19 Able service on these com-
mittees can lead to even higher office. Nonlawyers cannot traverse this
route.
C. ACCREDITATION AND POLITICAL ACCESS OF BLACKS
Because accreditation reduces the number of black lawyers, it
reduces blacks' access to political office. It is no coincidence that blacks
are underrepresented both as lawyers and, as discussed in the introduc-
tion, in politics; accreditation's barrier to the legal profession also blocks
blacks from political office.
114 See generally Joseph A. Schlesinger, Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified
View, MIDWEST J. POL. Sci., May 1957, at 26.
115 See Cohen, supra note 108, at 566.
116 Id. at 565-66; Derge, supra note 113, at 411.
117 See Cohen, supra note 108, at 573; Paul L. Hain & James E. Piereson, Lawyers and
Politics Revisited: Structural Advantages of Lawyer-Politicians, 19 AM. J. POL. Sci. 41, 45-46
(1975).
118 See Cohen, supra note 108, at 573-74.
119 See Derge, supra note 113, at 423.
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Accreditation does not completely exclude blacks from the political
aristocracy. The small number of blacks who become lawyers despite
accreditation can enter politics through this easy, traditional route. In
addition, even the blacks who are excluded from the law still have a
chance of entering politics from other professions, although the chance is
smaller than for lawyers. Accreditation severely constricts a major
feeder artery for blacks into politics.
That the underrepresentation of blacks in politics is caused at least
in part by accreditation and the bar is suggested by four factors.
First, we have seen that being a lawyer is more important in higher
political offices. If accreditation were affecting black political careers,
we would expect to see the lowest proportions of blacks in the highest
political offices.
This is precisely the pattern that we observe. For example, although
there are several black mayors of large cities,' 20 and 9% of the U.S.
House of Representatives is black, no U.S. senators are black, no state
governors are black, and no presidents have been black.' 2'
Second, the careers of individual black politicians suggest that ac-
creditation excludes blacks from politics. Although leading white politi-
cians are often lawyers, many black leaders are not attorneys. Many,
such as Martin Luther King and Jesse Jackson, have been clergymen
rather than lawyers. This may be due merely to different traditions in the
black community.
However, it may be too that potential black leaders recognized that
careers in the law were blocked off from them. For example, it appears
that Martin Luther King scored in the bottom half of the GRE, the quali-
fying exam for graduate school.' 22 An equivalent score on the LSAT
would have prevented him from attending any law school. Thus, future
black leaders instead have attempted to find other routes into politics,
such as the church. Perhaps if the legal profession had not been so
closed to blacks, they would have entered politics through law school
rather than the pulpit. Despite the availability of the church as an alter-
nate route into politics for a few extraordinary leaders, the main, most
easily traversed route is all but closed to blacks. Accreditation is a major
barrier that blocks it.
120 MILES TO GO, supra note 2, at 17 tbl.39 (identifying black mayors of the fourth-,
fifth-, ninth-, tenth-, twelfth-, fifteenth-, eighteenth-, and twenty-third-largest cities in 2000).
121 In the 107th Congress, thirty-nine out of the 435 representatives were black. There
have only been four black senators (only two popularly elected in the 20th century, Edward W.
Brooke of Massachusetts and Carol Moseley-Braun of Illinois) and only one elected black
governor (L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia).
122 Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the River, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1617.
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Third, historical evidence suggests that the imposition of accredita-
tion and the bar changed the composition of various elected bodies. The
for-profit, night law schools of the early 1900s opened up the law to
immigrants and the poor.'2 3 Graduates of these schools quickly ex-
ploited this route into politics. For example, the Massachusetts legisla-
ture in the 1920s included an average of more than twenty-five members
from one night law school alone. 124 When accreditation closed or trans-
formed these schools, it restricted an important path into politics for
these groups.
Fourth, the disproportionate success in politics of the few blacks
who succeed in passing through the ABA's accreditation gauntlet sug-
gests the degree to which accreditation suppresses black political leaders.
Black lawyers often succeed in politics at a much higher rate than law-
yers from other groups. One indication of this is the large fraction of
black lawyers who become judges.125 Becoming a judge is often a politi-
cal process. In many state jurisdictions, judges are elected. In other
states and in the federal courts, judges are appointed in a system that
often seems nearly as political as an election. The nominations to the
Supreme Court of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas are examples.
Blacks succeed in the political process to become a judge at a rela-
tive rate double that for other lawyers. More than 8% of black lawyers
are judges, compared with only 4% of lawyers from other groups-al-
though the absolute number of black judges is nonetheless small because
there are so few black lawyers. 126 But for accreditation, far more blacks
would achieve elected or appointed political office via the normal route
of becoming a lawyer. If permitted to become lawyers, blacks succeed in
the political process. But accreditation prevents them from becoming
lawyers.
The reduction in the number of black politicians imposes large
harms. Although nonblack politicians may strive to represent black con-
stituents ably, the absence of many black politicians inevitably makes
government less responsive to blacks. Accreditation silences the voices
of black political leaders who would otherwise represent blacks' interests
on the full array of issues that are crucial for the black community.
Blacks may forcefully argue that accreditation and the bar operate as
shackles, left over from a racist era, for excluding them from power.
123 See supra text at note 25.
124 ABEL, supra note 16, at 54.
125 Id. at I11.
126 As of 1990, 2278 of 27,948 black lawyers are judges, compared with 32,394 of the
nation's 779,471 total number of lawyers. MILES TO Go, supra note 2, at I tbl.I. Blacks are
3.4% of lawyers but 7.0% of judges. See supra notes 2, 3.
DEFENDING THE ARISTOCRACY
Likewise, the absence of black judges stifles the black voice in jus-
tice and the legal system. Many have suggested both that black judges
represent blacks' interests in the legal system and that black judges de-
cide cases differently than white judges do. 127 Without black judges, the
legal system loses an important voice and perspective, and it fails to re-
flect black community values.' 28
It is unconstitutional for courts to exclude jurors because they are
black.' 29 Excluding black jurors unconstitutionally eliminates the black
perspective from the jury box and increases the appearance of possible
bias and unfairness.130 It also may lead to different outcomes that disfa-
vor blacks, decrease respect for the courts, and demean the excluded
jurors. 131
When the accreditation system excludes blacks from being judges, it
causes these same harms, but magnified. Like jurors, judges influence
the outcome of cases. Bench trials, motion practice, and a host of other
decisions that are made during litigation are all decided by judges, not
jurors. Indeed, because only a small fraction of cases are resolved by
juries, judges decide many of the rest and wield much discretion in doing
so. The elimination of many black judges and their unique perspective
inevitably changes litigation outcomes.
III. ACCREDITATION SHOULD BE ELIMINATED AS
A BARRIER
Because of accreditation's many harms and few benefits, it should
be eliminated as a barrier to the legal profession. The states should no
longer restrict licenses to practice law to those who possess a diploma
from an ABA-accredited law school. As others have suggested, the bar
exam should also be eliminated as a barrier. 132
A world without accreditation and the bar exam as barriers would
have the following characteristics. Some states would choose to follow
the California model, requiring lawyers still to have attended some law
school, even if not an accredited one. In these states, as in California
currently, many more law schools would exist, many of which would
127 See, e.g., Ifill, supra note 2, at 98-99, 102-03.
128 Id. at 102-03.
129 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
130 Id. at 87.
131 Cf J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141 (1994) (identifying the same harms that
result from exclusion of black jurors to invalidate exclusion of women jurors).
132 See, e.g., Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note t, at 2253-54; Johnson, supra note 14, at
1033; cf generally Merritt et al., supra note 14 (arguing that empirical evidence does not
support the need to raise the scores needed to pass the bar in order to produce competent
lawyers).
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serve high proportions of minorities. 133 Just as many predominantly
black colleges now exist, new black law schools would open. Other new
law schools, while not primarily black, would serve substantial numbers
of minorities.
Without the cost increases from accreditation, the new schools
could offer much lower tuition than present accredited schools and offer
more flexible programs. The unaccredited schools in California provide
examples of the schools that could arise. For example, the Monterey
College of Law provides a program of entirely night instruction over four
years. All instructors are practitioners. Tuition is $6600 per year.134
The new schools would offer students much broader choices. Stu-
dents who hoped to work on sophisticated legal matters at elite law firms
would continue to choose expensive, full-service law schools with large
libraries and full-time faculties. Students who hoped to have legal prac-
tices working with individuals on simpler matters, or who hoped to work
as lawyers in local business or government, might choose a more basic
law school. No longer would the ABA force a lawyer who sought a
Camry legal practice to purchase a Mercedes legal education.
Other states might not require law school at all. Students would be
able to choose several routes into the profession. Some would choose
law school. Others would learn to be lawyers through apprenticeships.
The market would match each job with a lawyer with the appropriate
training.
This would not be a radical experiment. Instead, it would merely
return the legal profession to the system that worked well for a century
before the 1920s, the same system that many other professions now em-
ploy, such as business and accounting. As in business and accounting,
some would enter the profession directly, without professional school.
Others, who seek higher-level jobs, would voluntarily attend professional
school. Some would combine both approaches, first entering the profes-
sion directly for a few years, and then attending professional school.
Regardless of whether a state chose still to require attendance at
some law school, elimination of the accreditation and bar exam barriers
would induce a large increase in the number of lawyers. Some of the
new lawyers would be among the finest in the profession. Many people
with excellent potential as lawyers are now excluded by the bar exam
and the ABA's arbitrary accreditation standards. 135 Other new lawyers
would possess varying levels of ability, as under the present system. A
large part of the additional lawyers would be black. We have seen that
133 The proportion of black students in unaccredited schools in California is approxi-
mately double the proportion in accredited schools there. Shepherd, supra note t.
134 Van Tuyl et al., supra note 85, at 526-27 (1999 figure).
135 See Shepherd, supra note t; see generally Merritt et al., supra note 14.
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accreditation disproportionately excludes blacks. Thus, the elimination
of accreditation as a barrier would disproportionately allow blacks into
the profession. 136
The United States has too few lawyers. This is seen by the simple
fact that lawyers are often available only for $60 per hour or more; the
insufficient supply of lawyers causes prices to rise to this high level.
Obeying the laws of supply and demand, the large increase in the number
of lawyers from the elimination of the ABA system would be followed
by a dramatic decline in the price of some legal services. The competi-
tion from additional lawyers would push down prices. In addition, the
reduction in tuition rates would now permit unsubsidized lawyers to
thrive on lower salaries. If the requirement of attending law school were
completely eliminated, then lawyers would be able to thrive on even
lower incomes.
In the new unconstrained market, competent lawyers would be
available for a variety of prices, from $300 per hour or more for the
finest representation, down to $25 per hour or less for simple tasks. The
$25 rate is what qualified professionals with similar training earn in other
fields, such as management of small businesses, bookkeeping, tax prepa-
ration, nursing, carpentry, plumbing, and physical therapy. 137 For exam-
ple, a consumer can choose to have a complicated return prepared by a
certified public accountant at $150 per hour or more. Or she can have a
simpler return done at H&R Block, which charges approximately $25 per
hour.' 38
The ABA system may protect some consumers in the market for
legal services from incompetent or deceptive lawyers. However, the
benefits of accreditation in protecting consumers of legal services appear
to be small. Although many lawyers in California attend unaccredited
law schools, California does not appear to have higher levels of lawyer
malpractice or dishonesty.139 Moreover, for a century ending only in the
mid-1920s, consumers did fine with no accreditation and a perfunctory
bar exam. Many sophisticated commentators recall this golden age of
lawyering, when lawyers such as Lincoln were responsible professionals
who delighted in public service.' 40
136 See Shepherd, supra note t.
137 For example, H&R Block charges approximately $25 per hour for tax preparation
services and pays its preparers approximately $15 per hour. Interview with Theodora Shep-
herd, H&R Block tax preparer (June 17, 2000).
138 Id.
139 Although California does not require accreditation, it still requires passage of a bar
exam. Indeed, Californians who bypass ABA-accredited schools must pass an additional
"baby bar exam." See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note t, at 2124-25.
140 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 3, 14-16 (1993); WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE
CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 174 (1978).
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Furthermore, even if the ABA system provided some protections,
many sophisticated consumers of legal services, such as corporate gen-
eral counsel, do not need this protection. Instead, they will consider the
professional reputations of various lawyers and their firms, their experi-
ence, and information from referrals and references. For them, the ac-
creditation system increases the cost of legal services without any
offsetting benefit. However, the poor and unsophisticated are less able to
protect themselves. The accreditation system helps to eliminate at least
some incompetent lawyers whom they might otherwise hire.
Yet the ABA system also harms the poor or unsophisticated by re-
ducing the supply of legal services and increasing costs. The same poor
or unsophisticated consumers who would benefit from the protections of
the system may be unable to afford any lawyer at all because of the
system. Accreditation may increase the quality of lawyers somewhat.
However, it causes the lawyers to be too expensive for most low-income
citizens to afford.
If the ABA system ended, the market would adapt by creating insti-
tutions that would protect consumers. Institutions like H&R Block
would arise for providing low-cost legal services. Entrepreneurs would
establish companies that would hire the new low-cost lawyers, train
them, monitor the services that they provide consumers, and guarantee
their performance. For these functions, consumers would be willing to
pay the new companies a premium over the salaries of the individual
lawyers. For elite lawyers, large law firms already serve this function.
To provide a similar function at the new inexpensive end of the legal
market, the new companies would probably be larger than existing law
firms. To earn a reputation of which unsophisticated consumers would
be aware, the new companies might need to operate on a national scale
with national advertising.
Even if the accreditation system helps protect some consumers from
incompetent or dishonest lawyers, better ways exist to protect consum-
ers. The accreditation system protects consumers at best only indirectly,
by indiscriminately excluding swaths of people from the profession. In-
stead, mechanisms should be created for attacking incompetence and dis-
honesty directly, without excluding people who would make able
lawyers. Lawyers who act incompetently or dishonestly should be pun-
ished more severely. Perhaps responsibility for disciplining lawyers
should be transferred away from bar associations, which tend to be leni-
ent. Perhaps state governments should hire detectives and attorneys to
investigate and prosecute errant attorneys.
To protect consumers further, states could establish nondiscrimina-
tory, nonexclusionary versions of the bar exam and accreditation. The
bar exam could remain mandatory, but everyone could still practice law,
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regardless of her score on the exam. Instead of operating as a barrier to
the profession, the exam scores, which would be publicly available,
would provide consumers with information about each lawyer's skill and
knowledge. Similarly, accreditation of law schools might continue, but
on a voluntary basis, as with business schools and colleges. In order to
attract better students, a law school might choose to obtain accreditation.
Other law schools, to reduce costs and offer lower tuition, would forgo
accreditation.
These changes would empower blacks, tilting the playing field back
toward them. More legal services would be available to them, and their
incomes would increase. In addition to gaining economic power, blacks
would enlarge their political power. The elimination of the unfair and
unnecessary barriers to blacks' participation in politics would expand
their numbers in elected and appointed political offices, providing them
additional authority in the courtroom, in legislatures, and in the executive
branch.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown that a major cause of the small number of
blacks in both elected and appointed political office is the ABA's system
for accrediting law schools. The system does this in two steps.
First, the system has been structured to exclude most blacks from
the legal profession while welcoming most whites. The system exploits
the differences in average academic performance for the two groups. For
example, the system establishes cutoffs for a school's average LSAT
scores and undergraduate grades that approve schools that serve whites
but reject most that serve blacks. Likewise, the system exploits the dif-
ferences in average wealth of blacks and whites. The system more than
doubles law schools' costs by requiring expensive facilities and services,
leading to equivalent tuition increases at many schools. Because blacks
have much lower incomes and wealth than whites, the financial discrimi-
nation again excludes more blacks than whites.
Second, the absence of black lawyers leads to a similar absence of
black politicians. Being a lawyer is an absolute prerequisite for many
positions that are acquired either by election or through the political ap-
pointment process. These positions often lead to other political offices.
In addition, being a lawyer is often of great benefit in obtaining even the
political jobs for which a law degree is not a requirement. Accordingly,
lawyers constitute a high fraction of politicians, especially at high levels.
It is no accident that accreditation disproportionately harms blacks.
The ABA established the accreditation system in the 1920s in large part
to reduce competition for existing lawyers by reducing the number of
new minority attorneys.
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Although this article focuses on blacks, they are not the only group
that accreditation excludes from politics. Hispanics, Mexican-Ameri-
cans, and other groups with relatively low test scores, grades, and in-
comes are also injured. Incomes for Hispanics and Mexican-Americans
are far lower than for whites.' 4 1 Likewise, their average LSAT scores
and grades are lower than for whites, although the difference is not as
great as for blacks. 142 Thus, although in 1990 Hispanics were approxi-
mately 9% of the population, they were only 2.5% of all lawyers and
judges. 43 Similarly, accreditation excludes from political participation
those whites with low scores, grades, or incomes.
Accreditation thus maintains in politics a wealthy, white, intellec-
tual elite. Accreditation muffles the political voices both of people of
color and of people without wealth or top scores and grades. That is, it
muffles society's disadvantaged groups. As in the House of Lords in
England, the disadvantaged must rely for representation on politicians
whose backgrounds, interests, and incentives differ from their own. It is
no surprise that with no House of Commons, the interests of the disad-
vantaged are often ignored.
Accreditation should be eliminated as a barrier to the legal profes-
sion. Some states could still require attendance at law school but permit
unaccredited schools. Although the existing elite schools would continue
to exist, many new law schools would open, competing with lower tui-
tion and innovative programs. The number of schools for blacks would
grow substantially, mirroring the large number of black undergraduate
institutions. Other states might not require law school at all, reinstating
the system that existed for a century before the mid-1920s. As in busi-
ness and accounting, students could enter the profession through on-the-
job apprenticeship, professional school, or a combination of both.
The number of lawyers would increase substantially, especially the
number of black lawyers. This would lead to an increase in the number
of black politicians. The price of legal services would decline, making
affordable legal services available for the first time to the poor and mid-
dle class, especially blacks. Competent lawyers would now be available
for $25 per hour for simple tasks.
141 In 2000, the median income for Hispanics of all races was $33,455, compared with
$30,436 for all blacks and $44,232 for all whites. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at
433 tbl.653.
142 In 1998-99, the average LSAT scores and undergraduate grades for Chicano and
Mexican-Americans and Hispanic and Latino applicants to law school were 148/B and 147/B,
compared with 153/B+ for whites and 142/B- for blacks. LSAT PERFORMANCE, supra note 50.
Accreditation does not harm Asians and Pacific Islanders as a group. Their average LSAT
scores, undergraduate grades, and incomes are all above the levels for whites. Id.; STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT, supra note I, at 478 tbl.750.
143 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 13 tbl.10; MILES TO Go, supra note 2, at 2
tbl.2.
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Legal incompetence and fraud would increase little, if at all. Al-
though the poor and middle class might benefit marginally from the pro-
tections that accreditation provides, accreditation tends to make legal
services too expensive for these groups to afford. Moreover, the market
would inspire new institutions that would protect these consumers. Na-
tional law companies like H&R Block would arise to provide reliable,
inexpensive legal services.

